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The People's Republic of China has announced an ambitious goal of
establishing China as a leader among the industrial nations by the year
2000.1 The "Four Modernizations," as they have become known in
Chinese rhetoric, are an attempt to simultaneously improve industry,
agriculture, science and technology, and defense, and will guide China
in its move toward economic progress. To achieve its goal, China will
need a massive amount of foreign capital and technology.3
To obtain the requisite foreign capital and technology, China greatly
increased the scope, character, and complexity of permissible foreign
investment and trade agreements.4 The nature of these more complex
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1. See Note, China, Modernization, and Sino-United States Trade: Will China
Submit to Arbitration?, 10 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 53, 55 (1980) [hereinafter China, Mod-
ernization, and Arbitration] (stating that together with the goal of achieving societal
modernity by the year 2000, Deng Xiaoping is also urging China to strive to become a
world leader in economic and military affairs by the end of the century); see also Lock-
ett, Dispute Settlement in the People's Republic of China: The Developing Role of
Arbitration in Foreign Trade and Maritime Disputes, 16 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. &
ECON. 239, 239 (1982) (describing these ambitious goals as a significant change in
China's attitude toward involvement with foreign nations).
2. See China, Modernization, and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 55 (stating that the
Four Modernizations is the principal engine for the attainment of economic progress in
the People's Republic of China).
3. See id. at 56 (stressing the need for foreign economic assistance if China is to
accomplish its domestic goals); see also Denny, The Impact of Foreign Aid, CH. Bus.
REv., Sept./Oct. 1986, at 22 (asserting that China shed its attitude of self-reliance
when it unveiled a new economic agenda in late 1978). China has since emerged as an
active recipient of foreign assistance. Id. The decision to abandon self-reliant policies
and accept foreign investment rank among the most important symbolic shifts in
Deng's economic agenda. Id.
4. See Comment, Commercial Dispute Resolution Between the United States and
the People's Republic of China: Problems and Prospects. 7 SUrOLK TRANSNAT'L LJ.
329, 346 (1983) [hereinafter Commercial Dispute Resolution] (noting that China's
experimentation with various types of foreign participation may also signal a willing-
ness to submit disputes to alternate forms of dispute resolution in order to facilitate its
increased involvement in global trade).
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agreements requires the foreign partners to risk larger investments over
longer periods of time.5 The inevitable disputes arising from these more
involved international transactions require neutral, international
resolutions.'
Chinese traditional insistence on informal dispute resolutions is grad-
ually relenting under pressure to compete aggressively in the world eco-
nomic market.7 Greater numbers of Sino-foreign contracts and entire
areas of Chinese trade legislation now provide for arbitration conducted
in international fora.8 There is a significant danger that Western inves-
tors will misunderstand Chinese trade and investment goals unless they
develop a sensitivity to the unique cultural, social, political, and legal
environment within China.'
This Comment discusses the philosophical underpinnings of China's
historic reluctance to arbitrate and analyzes the policies behind China's
recent decision to participate in international arbitration. 10 Part I fo-
5. Chew-Lafitte, The Resolution of Transnational Commercial Disputes in the
People's Republic of China: A Guide for Legal Practitioners, 8 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 236, 241 (1982).
6. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 346 (criticizing China's
domestic method of dispute resolution as lacking speed, coherence, uniformity, and pre-
dictability, all features necessary for continued expansion of international trade); see
also Rubin, Overview, in INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES: AVOIDANCE AND
SETTLEMENT 11 (S. Rubin and R. Nelson eds. 1985) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL IN-
VESTMENT DISPUTES] (suggesting that China does not exhibit a unique concern for the
continued growth of its international trade). The need for, and shortages, of private
investment capital on a worldwide basis are among the most effective factors in the
global development of new techniques for dispute avoidance and settlement. Id.
7. See Cohen, The Role of Arbitration in Economic Cooperation With China, in
FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE LAW IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA,
296, 297 (M. Moser ed. 1984) [hereinafter FOREIGN TRADE, INVESTMENT AND THE
LAW] (suggesting that if China cannot handle international disputes in a neutrally
satisfactory manner, foreign investor confidence in China will diminish). China's repu-
tation for settling international disputes will constitute a crucial factor in investor confi-
dence by the international commercial marketplace. Id.
8. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 358 (arguing that crucial
to China's stated policy of increasing its economic independence is its ability to func-
tion effectively within the rules set by the global market). To function within this mar-
ket, China must participate in neutral, international arbitration. Id.
9. See Pritchard, China's Economic Law in Context, 14 INT'L BUS. LAW. 333,
333 (1986) (advising Western investors to gain basic understandings of the cultural,
political, and social views of their Eastern counterparts before attempting to negotiate
a contract with the Chinese).
10. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 57 (commenting
that China's willingness to submit to international arbitration represents a logical ex-
tension of the shifts in economic and political philosophy under the Deng regime). Such
shifts in domestic policy ultimately ensure China's full participation in international
trade. Id. China's goals for economic development will convince its leadership to accept
any international trade practice that represents its best interests in the long term, such
as submission of its trade disputes to international arbitration. Id. at 92.
[VOL. 4:137
CHINA & INT. COMM. ARB.
cuses on China's historic and philosophic distrust of the use of law and
third party intervention to resolve disputes. Part II discusses China's
new international trade environment and argues that China must ex-
hibit a willingness to submit to international arbitration"' if it wishes to
competitively seek the foreign currency needed to complete the Four
Modernizations. Part III traces the transformation of traditional do-
mestic dispute resolution concepts as they come in contact with the
modern legal thought of Marx and Mao. The Comment concludes with
a practical guide for drafting an effective international arbitration
clause 12 and suggests sites most likely to resolve a Sino-foreign trade
dispute.
I. CHINA'S LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
A. HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL LEGAL ROom
Chinese legal scholars regard the Western legal tradition as overly
litigious and offensive for its singular focus on the vindication of indi-
vidual rights. 3 In comparison, Chinese legal traditions seek equitable
solutions, bringing both parties into harmony with each other and with
society through the use of informal discussion and negotiation. 4 This
emphasis on reconciliation rather than litigation reflects the Chinese
desire to avoid direct confrontation and disruption of societal har-
mony. 5 Chinese dispute resolution desires to promote fluid discussion,
11. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 330 (arguing that China
is able to amend its preferred methods of dispute resolution, negotiation, consultation,
and mediation to conform to the needs of international commerce without betraying its
fundamental philosophies).
12. See Holtzmann, A New Look at Resolving Disputes in US.-China Trade
[hereinafter Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade], in A NEw LOOK AT THE LEGAL ASPECTS
OF DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA, DEVELOPMENTS A YEAR AFTER RECOGNITION 332 (H.
Holtzmann and W. Surrey eds. 1979) [hereinafter A NEw LOOK] (noting that the
presence of a well-drafted arbitration clause always provides a useful negotiation tool
for Western investors). If both parties are aware that their contract includes an effec-
tive arbitration clause, each has strong incentive to conduct business according to its
stated terms. Id. An arbitration clause with a well-defined "trigger" mechanism
designed to move the parties out of the "friendly negotiation" stages represents the best
defense against unacceptable delay in the preliminary stages of dispute settlement. Id.
13. See Utter, Dispute Resolution in China, 62 WASH. L. REV. 383, 392 (portray-
ing Chinese emphasis on conciliation between the parties as a lesson for those seeking
improvement of the Western adjudication model). Chinese jurists have criticized capi-
talistic legal systems for trivializing and commercializing such fundamental values as
human dignity into items having a "market price" and adequately compensated for in
dollars. Id.
14. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 335 (describing the es-
sential differences between the Eastern and Western approaches toward dispute
resolution).
15. See id. at 336 (suggesting that the use of compromise techniques best amelio-
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rather than confrontation between the parties in an effort to maintain
their relationship.
16
The avoidance of formal solutions imposed by third parties has deep
roots in Chinese philosophy. From the time of Confucius 17 to the pre-
sent, concepts of 1i and fa formed the nucleus of Chinese legal
thought.18 Li, a philosophical concept, forms a body of rules regulating
social conduct.' 9 Li retains primary importance over fa and encom-
passes normative rules of morality and proper behavior.2 The essential
goal of 1i is to preserve social harmony through emulation of virtuous
conduct and correct thought.2 Li stresses compromise and friendly dis-
cussion. 2 When a dispute disrupts societal harmony, the community
rates disruption of societal harmony). But see Wu Xiaoming, "Relationship" Bahl It's
the Law that Counts, China Daily, Aug. 28, 1986, at 4 (describing a protracted civil
lawsuit between two Chinese parties indicating to Chinese business that in their eco-
nomic activities the law counts far more than the "feelings" of the interested parties).
Traditional Asian philosophies promoting harmony and stressing friendship are out-
dated and do not accommodate the needs of a market-oriented economy. Id.
16. See Li, Reflections on the Current Drive Toward Greater Legalization in
China, [hereinafter Reflections] in A NEw LOOK, supra note 12, at 81, 86 (concluding
that the desire to maintain existing familial and commercial relationships does not re-
present a belief system unique to the Chinese but rather reflects a universal sociological
need to peacefully co-exist). The nature of community life consists not of isolated con-
frontations, but rather facilitation of the flow of relationships over time. Id. Such con-
tinuity requires a dispute resolution mechanism that promotes the reestablishment of
good societal relations, not the vindication of an individual's personal rights. Id.
17. See DeAngelis, The People's Republic of China, in LEGAL TRADITIONS AND
SYSTEMS: AN INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK 243 (A. Katz ed. 1986) (providing a histori-
cal analysis of the factors contributing to the rise of the Confucian belief system among
the peoples of the Yellow River Basin during the first millennium B.C.). Confucianism,
a synthesis of various religious and philosophical traditions, actually predates Confu-
cius' own era. id. at 244.
18. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 336 (discussing Con-
fucian principles of li and fa, and their subsequent historical development to reflect
notions of moral propriety and penal transgressions).
19. See Lee & Lai, The Chinese Conception of Law: Confucian, Legalist, and
Buddhist, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1307, 1308 (1978) (describing li as the embodiment of the
teachings of Confucius, stressing in particular, the "five relationships"). Li defines the
relationships between ruler and subject, father and son, husband and wife, elder and
younger brother, and friend and friend. Id. Li emphasizes moral rules and regulates
human desires. Id. Li continues to govern the rules of behavior affecting both interper-
sonal and international relations. Id. at 1312.
20. See id. at 1310-11 (comparing li, a form of social control that forbids tres-
passes before an individual commits them, tofa, a form of social control that punishes
an individual after the commission of a criminal act).
21. See id. (stressing that li is primarily concerned with loyalty and trustworthi-
ness); see also DeAngelis, supra note 17, at 245 (describing the Confucian desire to
mold human nature by providing moral leaders who rule through their virtuous exam-
ple). Accordingly, Confucianism teaches that society must structure its educational sys-
tem so as to reenforce ethical and moral behavior of all its citizens. Id.
22. See Lee & Lai, supra note 19, at 1310 (noting that the Confucian system of
compromise and yielding have remained far more important in Asian dispute resolution
[VOL. 4:137
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uses techniques of conciliation and mediation to help the parties reach
a compromise solution.23
Fa corresponds closely to the Western notion of the "rule of law."
2 4
Fa essentially codified those acts that Imperial Edicts forbade and stip-
ulated harsh sanctions in the event of a breach. 23 Traditional Chinese
society equated "law" or fa with coercion. 26 The imposition of fa to
affect behavior rather than the application of moral persuasion or emu-
lation of virtuous conduct represented a weak and inferior alternative.21
Although current Marxist/Maoist thought may no longer explicitly
mention 1i and fa, both ancient and modern Chinese philosophies im-
plictly share the belief that human nature remains fundamentally influ-
enced by these concepts.28
Confucian philosophy greatly emphasizes yielding and compromise
between the parties during dispute settlement.2 9 Resort to formalized,
third-party resolution necessarily results in a loss of face for the dispu-
tants.30 Failure to come to a successful resolution through informal
means implies that the parties are not able to honorably settle their
dispute."'
than the rigid invocation of "personal" rights).
23. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 60 (acknowledging
that Chinese social groups have deflected an enormous volume of potential litigation
from the courts using traditional mechanisms of mediation, conciliation, and yielding).
24. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 336 (translating fa to
mean "law" and occupying a much lower place than li among the virtues); see also
Lockett, supra note 1, at 241 (stating that the Chinese did not herald the "rule of law"
as a major social achievement but rather as a regrettable necessity used against those
who refused to submit to the moral persuasion of li).
25. See DeAngelis, supra note 17, at 245 (discussing the Legalist school as devel-
oping a diametrically opposed belief system to that of the Confucians). Lasting only a
brief fifteen years (Qin Dynasty 221 B.C.-206 B.C.), the Legalist school initiated harsh
persecutions of Confucian scholars. Id. Han Fei-tzu, who led the Legalists, rejected
Confucian optimism, declaring instead that man had an essentially bad character
which required strict accountability to the rule of law (fa). Id.
26. See Lee & Lai, supra note 19, at 1309 (describing the reliance of the Legalist
school on the threat of sanctions to coerce compliance with the law). In contrast, the
Confucians stress government by virtue or li rather than through sanctions or fa. Id.
27. See Reflections, supra note 16, at 85 (observing that as long as society func-
tioned harmoniously, law would remain something feared rather than invoked).
28. See Lee & Lai, supra note 19, at 1312 (noting that li continues to exert strong
influence over modern Chinese society and is still far more persuasive than governmen-
tal laws or decrees (fa)). In the modern Chinese context, li incorporates Party ideology
while fa merely embodies state regulations. Id.
29. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 337 (describing the most
celebrated and subtle legal art practiced since the time of Confucius as that of jang, or
the delicate art of yielding on certain points of the discussion in order to gain advan-
tage on others). Both the use of jang and the retention of li remain very much a part of
Chinese society under Communist rule. Id.
30. Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 252.
31. See Note, Dispute Settlement in China, 4 A.S.I.L.S. lINtL J. 71, 73 (1980)
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B. CURRENT LEGAL THOUGHT
China's current system of dispute resolution combines both the Con-
fucian notion that behavior is basically amenable to proper education
and the Marxist/Maoist emphasis on the rational ordering of society.32
This integrated belief system generates several interdependent princi-
ples guiding China's modern approach toward dispute resolution. These
principles form an overall framework allowing each stage of dispute
resolution to flow smoothly into the next.3 3 Basic understanding of the
principles that guide Chinese contract negotiators is important for any
Western investor attempting to negotiate a dispute resolution clause. 4
The Chinese maintain the firm belief that the parties in a dispute
resolution should seek the truth through facts and achieve a fair, rea-
sonable, and mutually beneficial solution. 5 The Chinese base this belief
on the traditional concept that human beings possess an essentially
good character and the ability to choose rational solutions when pro-
[hereinafter Dispute Settlement in China] (relating that even the victors in a tradi-
tional Chinese court often found themselves bankrupt, possibly tortured or at least hu-
miliated, in the process of giving evidence). In Imperial China the court system vaguely
defined offenses, awarded severe sanctions, and provided no definite court procedure.
Id. at 74.
32. See Li, Conflicts on Contracts and Why Things Are What They Are in China,
in NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR U.S.-CHINA TRADE, SPECIAL REPORT No. 4 19 (1974)
(explaining that Marxist philosophy views society as an organism capable of function-
ing in an orderly, rational manner with its "components" or citizens capable of decid-
ing matters rationally). Confucianism starts from the individual perspective and views
both individuals and the resultant societal unit as basically rational. Id. Both Marxist
and Confucianist philosophies share the belief that human beings have the capacity to
choose the most rational solutions to their disagreements. Id.
33. See Lockett, supra note 1, at 260 (specifying the four steps contained in the
dispute resolution process as friendly consultation, friendly negotiation with the assis-
tance of conciliators, non-binding recommendations by conciliators, and arbitration).
34. See Wallace, Negotiating With Government Agencies of Developing Countries
in the Pacific Basin, in CURRENT LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN THE PACIFIC
BASIN 289 (R. Rosendahl, ed. 1987) [hereinafter PACIFIC BASIN] (stressing the impor-
tance for Western investors to foster an awareness and sensitivity to policy and admin-
istrative tensions of the developing partner). Western negotiators' awareness of the de-
veloping partners' legal philosophy and social customs will provide a better basis for
contract negotiations than knowledge of their national laws or regulations. Id.; see also
Neilsen, Structuring and Negotiating Contractual Arrangements with Developing
Countries in the Pacific Basin, in PACIFIC BASIN, supra, at 334 (arguing that aware-
ness of cultural differences between the Chinese and Western partner represents the
single most important factor in the negotiation of a successful contract). Cultural sensi-
tivity can ease tension during the formation of the contract as well as promote prompt
reconciliation in the event of a dispute. Id. at 336.
35. See Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, in A NEW LOOK, supra note 12, at 265-67
(stating that when the Western investor attempts to settle a dispute with a Chinese
partner, the investor must thoroughly investigate the facts surrounding the dispute).
The Western investor should anticipate a lengthy discussion of all issues surrounding
the dispute. Id. at 266.
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vided all the facts.36 According to this view, only careful investigation
will reveal the truth to the parties and lead to a fair resolution of the
dispute.37
Equally fundamental to the Chinese is the belief that parties must
resolve contract disputes in a manner that both honors the contract and
obeys the law.38 The Chinese give great weight to strict construction of
the terms of the contract itself.39 Although the enactment of a commer-
cial legislative framework is a fairly recent phenomenon, China's desire
to encourage both its domestic and foreign commercial activities pro-
vides strong incentive for its adherance to a stable and enforceable sys-
tem of laws on which business executives can rely.' °
The Chinese legal system also maintains the fundamental impor-
tance of independence, equality, mutual benefit, and reference to inter-
national law." Most pieces of Chinese commercial legislation mention
principles of international law either explicitly, as in the preamble of
the Chinese Constitution,'2 or implicitly, as in the dispute settlement
clauses of certain commercial laws.'3 The concept of independence
36. See Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 253 (explaining that disputes require exten-
sive fact finding because parties often react emotionally, debilitating their reason).
37. See Lockett, supra note 1, at 258 (stating that the Western negotiator should
not overestimate Chinese insistence on "seeking truth through facts"). Only careful
investigation of all the facts surrounding the dispute will lead to its equitable solution.
Id.
38. See Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 254 (noting that the Chinese have a histori-
cal tradition of strictly adhering to contractual terms). The Chinese have developed an
excellent reputation among the international community for fulfilling contractual com-
mitments. Id. at 267.
39. See Lee & Lai, supra note 19, at 1312 (analogizing that the Chinese have held
the belief for the last two hundred years that once a provision enters a treaty it be-
comes "ironclad").
40. See Lubman, Institutional Changes in Trade With China, in A NEW LOOK,
supra note 12, at 192-93 (stating that in addition to China's Four Modernizations, a
fifth major modernization has occurred; the attempt to create a legal structure that will
assure the safety of current and future investments in China). In 1979, the Chinese
legislature in effect endorsed Western reliance on the "rule of law" when it enacted the
first set of legal codes in Communist China in the last thirty years. Id.
41. See Ren, China's Foreign Trade Arbitration, in CHINA'S FOREIGN TRADE,
Mar./Apr. 1981, at 4 (stating that China's experiences in dispute resolution prove that
parties can resolve their disputes reasonably and verifiably through an organic and dia-
lectic combination of conciliation and mediation stressing the principals of equality,
independence, and mutual benefit).
42. See The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, preamble, adopted at
the Fifth Session of the Fifth People's Congress on December 4, 1982, reprinted in
COMMERCIAL BUSINESS AND TRADE LAws: PEOPLE'S REPUBUC OF CHINA, pt. 3, bklt.
16 at 1 (0. Nee Jr. ed. 1987) [hereinafter TRADE LAWS] (stating that China adheres
to an independent foreign policy as well as to the principles of mutual respect, non-
aggression, equality, and mutual benefit).
43. See Law of The People's Republic of China on Joint Ventures Using Chinese
and Foreign Investment, art. 6 (adopted by the Second Session of the Fifth National
1989]
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closely relates to China's policy of international autonomy. China be-
lieves that as a sovereign state, it has the right to determine its own
economic destiny without undue foreign influence."' This belief pro-
vides a framework for the Chinese and foreign party to negotiate as
equals, ultimately concluding in a contract that mutually benefits both
parties.45 Should a dispute arise from that contract, its resolution must
reflect the equality of both parties and refer to settled principles of in-
ternational law and practice."6
II. CHINA'S CURRENT INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ENVIRONMENT
During the 13th Party Congress in October 1987, the Chinese Com-
munist Party selected a new party secretary and reaffirmed the eco-
nomic and political reforms that have guided China for the last dec-
ade.4 Party Secretary Zhao Ziyang presides over a politburo of top
officials who reached their political maturity after the Communist
revolution in 1949.48 The new leaders are more receptive to achieving
the institutional and political reforms necessary within the Communist
ideology to allow China to reach its full potential as a world leader.49
People's Congress on July 1, 1979, and promulgated on July 8, 1979) [hereinafter Joint
Venture Law], reprinted in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 1, bklt. 3 at 39, 41 (stat-
ing that should important problems arise during the life of the joint venture, the Board
of Directors must attempt to resolve disputes through consultation between the parties
and in accordance with principles of equality and mutual benefit); see also Law of the
People's Republic of China on Economic Contracts Involving Foreign Parties, art. 3,
(promulgated on March 21, 1985) [hereinafter Foreign Economic Contracts Law], re-
printed in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 1, bklt. 4, at 7 (stating that parties shall
conclude contracts in accordance with the principles of mutual benefit and equality,
and reach consensus through consultation).
44. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 57-59 (describing
a century of foreign oppression China experienced which began during the Opium
Wars of 1839-1842 and effectively continued until the Communist Party victory in
1949). The Communist Revolutionary leaders who took control of the Chinese main-
land criticized Western law as a tool of mass oppression and exploitation. Id. This
attitude culminated in Mao's xenophobic drive toward self-reliance. Id.
45. See Lockett, supra note 1, at 259 (emphasizing that belief in equality and mu-
tual benefit signifies Chinese reluctance to unilaterally insist on adopting only its views
into the contract).
46. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 315 (cautioning that while Chinese negotiators
often insist that Chinese domestic law should apply to contract disputes, they will mod-
ify this stipulation to permit reference to international legal standards).
47. Weil, The 13th Party Congress, Cn. Bus. REV., Jan./Feb. 1988, at 34. The
selection of China's new Communist Party leader Zhao Ziyang affirmed Deng's pro-
gram of economic and political reform. Id.
48. Id. at 34. The ages of the Politburo officials that Zhao will lead range from
fifty to sixty, compared to the previous group whose ages ranged in the seventies and
eighties. Id.
49. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 90 (noting that
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Zhao assumed power with a clear mandate from the Party to continue
Deng Xiaoping's successful economic reforms.
A. COMPLEXITY AND SCOPE OF COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
After the normalization 50 of the international trade and investment
relations suspended during Mao's program of "self-reliance,"51 China
permitted more competitive and innovative forms of foreign trade and
investment within its borders.52 China not only rapidly intensified its
foreign trade but has adopted more sophisticated contractual agree-
ments.5 3 China's insistence on informal solutions devised within the
framework of domestic mediation techniques alone is no longer feasi-
ble. A more formal approach is needed when attempting to resolve
complex multimillion dollar disputes involving investors representing all
variations of capitalism, socialism, and communism with their compet-
ing systems of economic philosophy and jurisprudence.' Unlike a sim-
ple purchase and sales agreement utilizing standard provisions, these
more complex transactions require the foreign partner to make larger
investments and assume greater risks in commercial relationships that
can bind the investors for several years or even decades."" The inevita-
Deng Xiaoping's moderate, pragmatic approach quickly replaced Mao Zedong's ideo-
logical fervor). China appears willing to free its economy from the restraints of the
"party line" to the point of compromising former ideological purity. Id.
50. See id. at 53-56 (providing a synopsis of the chain of diplomatic exchanges
which culminated in the normalization of relations between the United States and the
People's Republic of China). The normalization of relations with China began when
President Richard M. Nixon relaxed United States trade restrictions with China in
1969 and rescinded the United States objection to Chinese participation to the United
Nations in 1971. Id. at 53. President Nixon's visit to Beijing in 1972 was the final
indication of United States and Chinese desire to normalize relations. Id.
5i. See Horsley, The Regulation of China's Foreign Trade in FOREIGN TRADE,
INVESTMENT AND THE LAW, supra note 7, at 6 (describing Deng Xiaoping's specific
abandonment of Mao Zedong's ill-fated policy of xenophobic self-reliance in an effort
to obtain from abroad those items crucial to China's rapid modernization drive).
52. See Ingriselli, International Dispute Resolution and The People's Republic of
China, 12 INT'L Bus. LAW. 376, 376 (1984) (summarizing Chinese economic policy in
the 1970s and 1980s as geared toward the development of foreign trade, the importa-
tion of advanced technology, the utilization of foreign investment, and the expansion of
foreign economic cooperation and technical exchange); see also Armacost, The Peo-
ple's Republic of China: Economic Reform. Modernization and the Law, 3 CH. L.
REP. 153, 154 (1984-1985) (suggesting that Beijing's economic reforms over the past
decade represent one of the most courageous and extensive efforts to restructure a ma-
jor economy anywhere in the world).
53. See Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 241 (describing China's policy of aggres-
sively pursuing such complex transactions as licensing agreements, co-exploration of
natural resources, and equity joint ventures).
54. DeAngelis, supra note 17, at 268.
55. See Chew-LaFitte, supra note 5, at 241 (describing joint venture projects that
included the importation of an entire factory). An ambitious project such as a hotel
1989]
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ble disputes arising from transactions involving compensation trade,
joint ventures, profit-sharing agreements, and technology transfer re-
quire much more involved and neutral settlement procedures. 0 Interna-
tional commercial arbitration provides the flexibility needed when fac-
ing those challenges inherent in resolving transnational disputes.
7
B. CHINA'S NEW LEGAL SYSTEM
I. International Agreements
The inclusion of arbitration clauses in Chinese international agree-
ments exemplifies concrete application of Deng Xiaoping's "Open
Door" policy. 58 In 1979, China and the United States signed a major
bilateral trade treaty providing for the resolution of Sino-American dis-
putes to take place in a neutral forum.59 China has acceded to the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
complex could involve the parties in a variety of detailed negotiations spanning several
years and culminating in a contract that could last for decades. Id. at 242.
56. See id. at 242-48 (describing the business and legal elements of compensation,
joint venture, and cooperation productive agreements). Compensation trade agree-
ments, where the foreign party supplies equipment, expertise or finance and the Chi-
nese party supplies the elements of production, often involve arrangements that steadily
change as production of the goods expands. Id. at 242. Joint ventures often involve
flexible project durations and require the parties to divide all profits, risks, and losses
on a proportional measure. Id. at 244-45. Cooperative production agreements, where
both parties participate equally in the production process and share equally in profits
generated, may last for as long as twenty years. Id. at 248. On the whole, Sino-foreign
trade relationships are becoming much less predictable while increasing in duration. Id.
Both sides have an interest in minimizing the potential for misunderstandings in the
negotiation and resolution stages. Id. at 283. Due to the fact that the parties come from
vastly different cultural, social, and economic backgrounds, they may prefer to promote
their own dispute resolution procedures at the negotiation table. Id. at 283; see also
McLaughlin, Arbitration and Developing Countries, 13 INT'L LAW. 211, 214 (1979)
(cautioning that a developing country's goals and its perceptions of how to achieve
these goals may differ crucially from those of the Western investor).
57. See Yates, Arbitration or Court Litigation for Private International Dispute
Resolution & The Lesser of Two Evils, in RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES
THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 224, 231 (C. Carbonneau ed. 1986) [herein-
after RESOLVING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES] (stating that arbitration can meet the
unique needs of transnational investment disputes).
58. See generally Salter, The Awakening Dragon. The People's Republic of China
Enters the 21st Century, 86 COMM. L.J. 90 (1981) (providing an explanation of Deng
Xiaoping's "Open Door" policies and goals and their recognizable effects on China's
international treaty relations).
59. Agreement on Trade Relations, July 7, 1979, United States-The People's Re-
public of China, art. VIII, 31 U.S.T. 4651 T.I.A.S. No. 9630, reprinted in 18 I.L.M.
1041, 1049 (1979) [hereinafter Trade Agreement]. The Contracting Parties agreed to
settle of any dispute arising from or in relation to their contracts through friendly con-
sultation, conciliation, or mutually acceptable means, including international third
party arbitration. Id.
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Foreign Arbitral Awards"° and the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods."'
However, in areas such as natural resource exploitation, which impli-
cates China's national sovereignty, China will insist on the application
of domestic law to the contract.6 2 Only Chinese national courts or arbi-
tral institutions may decide disputes concerning expropriation of for-
eign property.63 This national sovereignty objection to the use of inter-
national arbitration frustrates attempts by the United States Trade
Representative to reach a consensus with China on a Sino-American
bilateral investment treaty. 4
2. Domestic Legislation
Responding to the fears of Western nations concerning the lack of
any system of legal norms after the Cultural Revolution,6 China has
rapidly enacted a commercial legislative structure.6 These trade laws
60. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter Con-
vention on Foreign Arbitral Awards].
61. United Nations Convention For the International Sale of Goods, U.N. Doe. A/
CONF 97/18, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 671 (1980) [hereinafter CISGI.
62. Regulations of the People's Republic of China on the Exploration of Offshore
Petroleum Resources in Cooperation with Foreign Enterprises (adopted by the State
Council on January 12, 1982 and promulgated by the State Council on January 30,
1982) [hereinafter Off Shore Oil Exploration Law], reprinted in TRADE LAws, supra
note 42, pt. 1, bklt. 3, art. 3, at 152.
63. Id. art. 3, at 152.
64. Frisbe, The Investment Treaty Impasse, CH. Bus. REV., Sept./Oct. 1986, at
41. The United States argues that a neutral third country should arbitrate questions
regarding whether an expropriation has occurred to ensure that the investor has ade-
quate protection when alleging domestic measures amounting to expropriation of its
property. Id. The Chinese, however, argue that a third party arbitration between the
Chinese government and a foreign national on matters other than the amount of com-
pensation due after its domestic court or arbitration system has acknowledged the exis-
tence of an expropriation constitutes a violation of its sovereignty. Id.
65. See, China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 57-63 (tracing
China's historic distrust for the law culminating in Mao's near eradication of China's
legal system during the Cultural Revolution).
66. See Yang Xiaobing, Laws Back Foreign Economic Activities, Beijing Rev.,
Feb. 16, 1987, at 14 (stating that thus far the State Council has promulgated close to
sixty laws and regulations dealing with foreign economic activities). In addition, minis-
tries and commissions under the State Council have promulgated over thirty rules and
regulations dealing with economic trade issues. Id.; see also Reflections, supra note 16,
at 83 (describing this rapid promulgation of legislation as a "veritable flood" demon-
strating China's desire to create an atmosphere of legal security for foreign commercial
transactions); accord Ingriselli, supra note 52, at 377 (noting the use of internal non-
published laws (neibu) when dealing with foreign investors has diminished as Deng's
regime continues to strive to implement a modern, stable, legal infrastructure). But see
Armacost, supra note 52, at 154, 155 (cautioning that this rapid expansion of legal
codes has not been met with universal approval from China's elite). The deepest roots
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cover a wide spectrum of commercial activity including equity joint
ventures,6 7 wholly foreign-owned enterprises,68 foreign economic con-
tracts,69 technology transfer,70 taxation, customs duties, 2 foreign ex-
change control,"7 arbitration procedures 7 4 trademark, 7r patent,70 crea-
of Chinese culture assume that China must remain aloof from all corrupting influences.
Id. Xenophobia, which has long guided Chinese foreign policy is still prevalent within
the Party, and accusations of "cultural contamination" have surfaced in Beijing. Id. at
155.
67. See Joint Venture Law, supra note 43, at 41 (discussing the establishment and
maintenance of joint ventures using Chinese and foreign investment).
68. The Law of the People's Republic of China Governing Foreign Capital Enter-
prises (adopted at the Fourth Session of the Sixth People's Congress on April 12,
1987), reprinted in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 1, bklt. 3, at 163. To expand
China's economy and technological exchange, China now permits wholly-foreign owned
enterprises. Id.
69. Foreign Economic Contracts Law, supra note 43, at 21. China formulated
these regulations to further expand economic and technological cooperation. Id. at 7.
70. Regulations of the People's Republic of China Governing Contracts for the Im-
portation of Technology (promulgated by the State Council on May 24, 1985), re-
printed in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 1, bklt. 4, at 27. The Chinese government
retains the authority to examine and approve the importation of all technology, regard-
less of the nationality of the supplier. Id.
71. The Income Tax Law of the People's Republic of China Concerning Foreign
Enterprises (adopted at the Fourth Session of the Fifth National People's Council on
December 13, 1981 and promulgated by an Order of Ye Jianying, Chairman of the
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on December 13, 1981), re-
printed in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 1, bklt. 5, at 75. All foreign enterprises
deriving a source of income within China must pay income tax in China. Id.
72. Regulations Governing Import and Export Customs Duties of the People's Re-
public of China (promulgated by the State Council on March 7, 1985), reprinted in
TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 1, bklt. 6, at 3. All goods permitted for import or
export are subject to a customs duty. Id.
73. Detailed Rules and Regulations for the Implementation of Foreign Exchange
Controls Governing Enterprises with Overseas Chinese Capital, Enterprises with For-
eign Capital, and Joint Ventures Using Chinese and Foreign Investment (approved by
the State Council on July 19, 1983 and promulgated by the State Administration of
Foreign Exchange Control on August 1, 1983), reprinted in TRADE LAWS, supra note
42, pt. 2, bklt. 7, at 81. China will regulate all joint venture enterprises using overseas
Chinese, Hong Kong and Macao capital, as well as other foreign capital. Id.
74. Decision of the Government Administration Council of the Central People's
Government Concerning the Establishment of a Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission
within the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) (adopted
on May 6, 1954 at the 215th Session of the Government Administration Council),
reprinted in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 2, bklt. 8, at 11; see also Provisional
Rules of Procedure for the Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission (FETAC) of the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (adopted March 31, 1956 at
the Fourth Session of the CCPIT), reprinted in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, bklt. 8, at
15. The Foreign Trade Arbitration Commission exercises jurisdiction in the arbitration
of disputes arising from contracts in foreign trade. Id.
75. Trademark Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the 24th Ses-
sion of the Standing Committee for the Fifth National People's Congress on August
23, 1982), reprinted in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 2, bklt. 9, at 13. The law
protects the exclusive use of trademarks. Id.
76. Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted by the Fourth Session
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tion of Special Economic Zones,77  import/export commodity
inspection,78 offshore oil exploration,7" and environmental protection 0
Three complex areas of commercial activity concern equity joint ven-
tures, contracts involving foreign partners, and the exploration of off-
shore oil resources. These pieces of legislation make specific reference
to the use of third party arbitration in the event conciliation or media-
tion does not resolve the dispute."' The Foreign Economic Contract
Law goes so far as to forbid litigation if the foreign economic contract
contains an arbitration clause, or if the parties agree subsequently to
arbitrate.8 2 The Law of Civil Procedure denies parties to any foreign
trade dispute access to Chinese courts if they have a written agreement
providing for arbitration. 3 The law further forbids the Chinese court
system to provide judicial review of any resulting arbitral awards, ren-
of the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress on March 12,
1984), reprinted in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 2, bklt. 9, at 53. The Patent Office
of the People's Republic of China shall receive and examine all patent applications and
grant patents that conform to its rules. Id.
77. Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress Con-
cerning the Authorization for the People's Congresses and Their Standing Committees
of Guangdong Province and Fujian Province to Formulate Various Specific Economic
Regulations For Their Respective Special Economic Zones (adopted on November 26,
1981), reprinted in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 2, bklt. 10, at 27. The Guangdong
and Fujian Provinces retain the primary authorization to formulate various economic
regulations unique to their special economic zones. Id.
78. Regulations of the People's Republic of China On the Inspection of Import and
Export Commodities (promulgated by the State Council on January 28, 1984), re-
printed in TRADE LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 2, bklt. 12, at 1.
79. Offshore Oil Exploration Law, supra note 62, at 151.
80. The Environmental Protection Law of the People's Republic of China (for trial
implementation, adopted in principle by the 11 th Session of the Standing Committee of
the Fifth National People's Congress on September 13, 1979), reprinted in TRADE
LAWS, supra note 42, pt. 3, bklt. 14, at 1.
81. See Joint Venture Law, supra note 43, at 44 art. 14 (providing that in the
event that the joint Board of Directors cannot resolve the dispute through consulta-
tions, the parties will request mediation or international arbitration); see also Foreign
Economic Contracts Law, supra note 43, art. 17 (providing that when contract disputes
occur, the parties shall, to the extent possible, resolve all disputes through consultations
or third party mediation; if the parties do not wish to consult, they may request inter-
national arbitration); Offshore Oil Exploration Law, supra note 62, at 160, art. 27
(providing that if consultation fails as a mechanism to solve a dispute, the parties may
settle the dispute through mediation or international arbitration).
82. See Foreign Economic Contract Law, supra note 43, art. 38 (stating that par-
ties may bring their dispute to the People's Court only if the parties do not have an
agreement providing for arbitration).
83. See Dispute Resolution Provisions of Selected Chinese Laws from the Law on
Civil Procedure, art. 192 March 8, 1982, reprinted in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING Busi-
NESS IN CHINA 373, 416 (J. Cohen chair. 1983) [hereinafter LEGAL ASPECTS] (stating
that if the parties have a provision in their contract for arbitration, they may not go to
the People's Court; if however, no arbitration provision exists, they may petition the
jurisdiction of the local People's Court).
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dering the utilization of the arbitration clause in a foreign economic
contract mandatory and the resulting award binding.84
China's domestic legal system is still in the process of evolving8" and
lacks the institutionalized infrastructure necessary to handle complex
commercial disputes. 86 China must still develop domestic arbitral
mechanisms to solve disputes fairly, quickly, and inexpensively, utiliz-
ing settled and neutral principles of dispute resolution.87 Once China
achieves a neutral dispute resolution mechanism domestically, or allows
the foreign party to utilize international arbitral fora, foreign confi-
dence and investment will expand and the influx of foreign currency
necessary for China's modernization can only increase. 88
III. CURRENT CHINESE DOMESTIC DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROCEDURES
A. CONCILIATION
During the resolution 4L,,a dispute, Chinese mediators apply the dif-
ferent facets of their underlying philosophies to form a cohesive pattern
of conciliation. 89 Once a disagreement between the parties becomes ap-
parent, the process of reconciliation begins with private, informal, bilat-
eral negotiations and gradually adds elements of structure and third
party interventionY Not until the last instance is resort made to formal
84. See id. art. 193, at 416 (stating that if a foreign arbitration organization exer-
cises jurisdiction, the parties no longer have access to the People's Court to either re-
view the application of the clause or to review the enforcement of the award).
85. See Cohen, supra note 7, at 296 (commenting that the internal domestic ten-
sions of a rapidly developing legal system combined with the external international
tensions involved in the competition for place in the world market contribute to China's
current investment volatility).
86. Cohen, Some Problems of Investing in China, in LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note
83, at 74.
87. Id. at 109-12.
88. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 67 (cautioning
that commercial disputes pose a serious obstacle to the smooth flow of international
trade). The parties in a commercial dispute must solve their dispute in a prompt, effi-
cient, and neutral fashion. Costly, bitter, and lengthy litigation in national courts can
only increase the costs and uncertainties inherent in transnational business. Id.
89. See Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12, at 247 (highlighting the fact
that the Chinese maintain a flexible approach to dispute resolution in which the several
steps of negotiation, consultation, conciliation, and mediation do not necessarily occur
in rigid sequence with each carefully separated from the next). Holtzmann states,
"[r]ather, as in a fine Peking glass bottle there may be several layers, each with a
different hue, each visible as a separate entity, yet all blending together to create a
total pattern." Id.
90. See generally id. at 247-51 (describing the increasingly formalized processes of
Chinese dispute resolution methods).
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arbitration. 9'
The Chinese encourage the use of friendly negotiation as the primary
mode of dispute settlement.92 Generally, these negotiations continue
throughout with discussions or exchange of correspondence." The Chi-
nese place an emphasis on understanding the position of the other party
and in seeking truth through facts.94 Once either party determines that
further informal discussions may not produce beneficial results, they
may proceed to the next step of the process, conciliation."
At the conciliation stage, the parties may utilize the services of the
China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT)f8
CCPIT handles the dispute in two stages. First, CCPIT brings the par-
ties together and attempts to encourage friendly negotiations and per-
sonal settlement of the dispute.97 The conciliators attempt to aid the
parties in reaching a mutually satisfactory result but at this stage they
do not usually make specific recommendations concerning the terms of
a conciliation statement. 98
91. See id. at 277 (noting that the Chinese dispute resolution technique stressing
friendship rather than confrontation does not radically differ from those methods any
rational international trader or investor would employ). Yet those investors relying on a
legal tradition that emphasizes the adversarial nature of disputes is more likely to apply
a confrontational strategy when faced with contractual disagreements. Id. In contrast,
the Chinese consistently point out that the techniques used in conflicts with enemies are
not appropriate for disagreements with friends. Id.
92. See Surrey & Sobel, Recent Developments in Dispute Resolution in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, in LEGAL ASPECTS, supra note 83, at 377 (explaining that
friendly consultation has no distinct beginning or ending, and instead it provides both a
continuous and a fluid mechanism to resolve disputes).
93. See, e.g., id. at 377-78 (arguing that this method of resolution allows the par-
ties to reach a solution without the parties becoming rigid in defense of abstract
principles).
94. Id. at 381.
95. See id. at 378-90 (providing a synopsis and examples of conciliation methods).
96. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 346-51 (explaining that
the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) is the principal
forum for dispute resolution in China).
97. Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12, at 241. The CCPIT approaches
disputes with a view toward friendly consultation and conciliation using arbitration
only as a last resort. Id.; Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 347. The
CCPIT focuses on the dispute in two stages: first seeking to resolve the dispute through
friendly consultation; and second, submitting the dispute to one of two arbitral bodies
contained within the CCPIT. Id. at 347.
98. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 348 (noting that at this
stage the conciliators attempt to focus the parties' attention on the terms of the con-
tract and allow them to fashion their own resolution). In the first stage CCPIT provides
the forum, but does not participate in any substantive way. Id. at 347; accord
Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12, at 279 (arguing that contrary to the
prevailing Western misconception, conciliation does not urge the partners to evenly
share liability, rather it urges the partners to pursue a solution within the terms of the
contract and in accordance with international trade practice).
1989]
152 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y [VOL. 4:137
If the parties still find themselves unable to reach a solution, the
CCPIT moves to the second stage and submits the dispute to the For-
eign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (FETAC) or the
Maritime Arbitration Commission (MAC). 9 While termed a concilia-
tion, at this stage the FETAC formally intervenes and will conduct its
own investigation into the issues. 00 The FETAC investigation
culminates in the formulation of specific recommendations and the
drafting of a non-binding conciliation statement. 10 If either party re-
jects these recommendations, FETAC considers the controversy appro-
priate for arbitration. 02
B. ARBITRATION
FETAC is also the institution responsible for overseeing the arbitra-
tion of all Sino-foreign trade and investment disputes. 10 3 FETAC,
which is supervised by the CCPIT and ultimately by the Ministry of
99. See Chew-LaFitte, supra note 5, at 263-66 (outlining the organizational struc-
ture of the CCPIT). The CCPIT directly supervises two arbitral institutions, the For-
eign Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (FETAC) and the Maritime Arbi-
tration Commission (MAC). Id. The FETAC assists in the resolution of all foreign
trade disputes concerning purchases or sale of merchandise contracts, transportation,
insurance, and any other disputes arising from foreign trade. Id. at 264. The MAC
specializes in dispute resolutions concerning maritime disagreements, including those
involving collisions, contracts, and shipping services. Id. at 266. Both the FETAC and
the MAC participate in a wide range of related activities to assist parties in the resolu-
tion of commercial disputes, including friendly negotiations, conciliation, and arbitra-
tion. Lockett, supra note 1, at 254.
100. See Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 267 (explaining that the FETAC facili-
tates the progress of fact finding and problem analysis); see also Commercial Dispute
Resolution, supra note 4, at 348 (assuming the parties still cannot reach a satisfactory
resolution, the FETAC undertakes independent research into the dispute and suggests
its own solution).
101. See Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12, at 288 (pointing out that
the legally trained members of the FETAC formulate recommendations based on infor-
mation gathered and analyzed earlier in the conciliation stage); Chew-Lafitte, supra
note 5, at 267 (stating that the FETAC conciliator assists the parties in analyzing the
facts, in presenting each side's strengths and weaknesses, and in urging the parties to
privately resolve their dispute).
102. See Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12, at 287 (describing the
functions of the FETAC at the final stage of conciliation as independently analyzing
the problem with the active participation of the disputants). The parties may request
recommendations as to the appropriate settlement terms from the FETAC. Id. Should
these prove unsatisfactory, the FETAC will then recommend that the parties begin
arbitration. Id. at 288. But see Cohen, supra note 7, at 304 (suggesting that these
informal discussions at the FETAC can continue indefinitely, giving a party the oppor-
tunity to reach a timely determination on the merits).
103. Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 264. FETAC's jurisdiction includes disputes
arising from contracts for the purchase or sale of merchandise in foreign trade, disputes
arising from transportation or insurance, or any other matter of business in foreign
trade including joint ventures, foreign loans, patents and trademarks.
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Trade, is heavily influenced by national governmental policies.'"
China's arbitration rules of procedure are employed,108 and only Chi-
nese nationals may be appointed to the arbitration panel. 00 UNCI-
TRAL Model Arbitration rules may only be included with the consent
of the panel upon prior agreement by the parties. 07 The foreign party
is thus faced with an arbitral system administered by the State, a pro-
ceeding conducted entirely in Chinese, a decision determined solely by
Chinese arbitrators following Chinese procedural and (depending on
the type of transaction) substantive law.
C. THE NEED FOR CHINA TO SUBMIT TO INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION
If foreign investors perceive the Chinese domestic dispute resolution
process as unstable or biased, the perception can only increase the cost
and uncertainty of trade or investment there. 08 Trade with the \Vest is
crucial to accomplishing the Four Modernizations.108 Increasing trade
with the West is the primary factor motivating China to overcome its
traditional reluctance to submit to "Western-style" international arbi-
tration.110 Moving a nation as vast and as rural as China into the
104. Id. at 265.
105. Tang Houzhi, Arbitration-Responses to Some Questions 2 (Mar. 1987) (on
file with The American University Journal of International Law & Policy).
106. Id. at 3.
107. Id. at 4.
108. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 330 (explaining that as
trade expands the number of disputes will inevitably multiply); accord McLaughlin,
supra note 56, at 212 (explaining that Western investors' perception of developing
countries as judicially naive or having unstable economic markets can significantly in-
crease the "price" of the contract). The foreign parties perceive this risk factor as a
contingent liability should they face possible contract litigation before the courts of the
domestic partner. Id.
109. See China, Moderization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 79, 80 (relating
that Deng Xiaoping's active pursuit of Western technology and financial resources
must persuade China to adopt internal dispute resolution policies to mirror those the
Western traders generally utilize). Id.
110. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 345-46 (arguing that
China under Deng's regime comprehensively revitalized its legal system in the areas of
foreign trade and investment). This revitalization has great significance for the interna-
tionalization of dispute resolution for Chinese traders. Id. First, it signals a willingness
to experiment with new legal forms and procedures. Id. at 346. Second, it demonstrates
the Party's strong commitment to compete as an economic actor in world trade rela-
tions, signifying a conscious rejection of Mao's policy of insulation and self-reliance. Id.
But see id. at 335 (noting that even with an express arbitration clause utilizing other
domestic or international fora, the Chinese insist on exhausting traditional methods of
mediation, negotiation, and conciliation before finally submitting to arbitration); see
also China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 56-57 (noting that with
the exception of a few isolated maritime disputes, virtually no trade matters have been
arbitrated either in Beijing or elsewhere).
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highly technical world of the twenty-first century will require enormous
amounts of foreign capital and technology."' 1 China has no choice but
to make its total investment climate both stable and lucrative for devel-
oped nations.' 12 A settlement process using transnational, neutral pro-
cedures elevates an international contractual dispute above the idiosyn-
cracies of the national legal systems." 3
Many refer to the international arbitral tribunal as the "business-
man's court""' 4 and international business investors view arbitration as
the preferred method of settling trade and investment disputes."'
Faced with the uncertainties and delays inherent in an informal concili-
ation process and the risks associated with a legal system still largely in
the drafting stage, many foreign investors insist on the inclusion of
third country arbitration clauses in their contracts with the Chinese.1"'
I 11. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 79-80 (describing
that for the first time since the founding of the Republic in 1949, China has accepted
government to government loans, borrowed from international agencies such as the
Asian Development Bank, and permitted direct foreign investment on its soil). In addi-
tion to shortages of capital and technology, China has an acute shortage of educated
managers, technicians, and engineers as a result of the decade of intellectual purges
during the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution campaigns. Id. at 82.
112. See Li, Trade with China: An Introduction, in LAW AND POLITICS IN CHINA'S
FOREIGN TRADE 12 (V. Li ed. 1977) (concluding that the greater the perceived need
for a Western product or investment, the greater the likelihood that the Chinese negoti-
ator will agree to the use of third country arbitration).
113. See Ingriselli, supra note 52, at 376 (speculating that the potential interna-
tional exposure of a contract dispute provides strong disincentive for a local Chinese
provincial entity to interfere unilaterally with the contract). The dispute resolution
clause represents an important stabilization mechanism for foreign investment and
trade with China, increasing both the value of the investment and the duration of the
relationship. Id.
114. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 69 (noting that
the international business community, faced with uncertainties of litigating in national
courts, reacted by developing their own substantive rules of commercial behavior); ac-
cord Jennings, Preface in RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, at v
(Redfern and Hunter eds. 1987) [hereinafter RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL Dis-
PUTES] (stating that "no business[man] in [his] right mind seeks litigation").
115. See McLaughlin, supra note 56, at 212 (listing the advantages of arbitration
as providing a flexible, mutually acceptable means of conflict resolution). Arbitration
procedures offer the parties an informal and understandable process. Id. The arbitrator
often possesses substantial knowledge of the particular subject area and does not need
to rely on judicial precedent in reaching an equitable solution. Id. The confidentiality of
the process often becomes the deciding factor when choosing to arbitrate instead of
litigate. Id. But see Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 331 (arguing
that adjudication also has certain advantages in the international arena). Id. Adjudica-
tion offers the supervision of a judge with judicial power to compel the production of
evidence. Id. Adjudication provides the parties with a more structured format and a
more predictable result. Id. at 332. Adjudication, however, brings the dispute before
the public. Id. This exposure of problems often causes significant disruption of the com-
mercial goodwill between the parties and may lower the confidence of the international
financial community in the strength of the venture. Id. at 331.
116. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 65 (arguing that
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Faced with the choice of international arbitration or national litiga-
tion, China also prefers arbitration to adjudication. Chinese govern-
mental entities have historically refused to adjudicate disputes, whether
in the domestic courts of the foreign investor' 7 or before international
tribunals.1 8 In direct conflict with the Confucian notions of conciliation
and compromise, the adversarial methods employed during litigation
lead the parties to sharpen their points of conflict, reinforce their adver-
sarial position, and at the conclusion of the proceedings, force the par-
ties to accept a court-imposed solution to their dispute.119 Arbitration,
however, keeps many of the procedural and substantive factors within
the control of the parties.120 They may negotiate the choice of forum,
the procedural rules, the identity of the arbitrators, and depending
upon the subject matter of the contract, the substantive law used to
resolve the conflict.1 ' The Chinese find arbitration especially appealing
because arbitrators, unlike judges, do not have to strictly follow the
rule of law (fa) but can look to other norms, including morality (i) to
the expansion of foreign trade into China has necessitated increased foreign scrutiny of
the present Chinese legal system); see also Surrey & Sobel, supra note 92, at 39 (stat-
ing that the preference of Chinese entities for including an arbitration clause in foreign
commercial contracts is increasing).
117. See Lockett, supra note 1, at 242-43 (describing the historical and ideological
reasons underlying China's distrust of Western "justice"). China first invoked interna-
tional law in a futile attempt to prevent the English from importing opium into
Guangzhou Province (Canton). Id. Their defeat in the resulting Opium War brought
with it a century of foreign occupation and interference in China's foreign relations and
domestic affairs. Id. Further abuses of international law by the Western powers only
increased China's distrust for the West. Id. Particularly odious were the unequal trea-
ties imposed by the superpowers allowing the West to control China's strategic parts.
Id. The West's current hostility toward Communism only serves to strengthen Chinese
conviction that justice in a Western court is an impossibility. Id. at 243.
118. See Comment, An Evaluation of the People's Republic of China's Participa-
tion in International Commercial Arbitration" Pragmatic Prospectus, 12 CAL W.
INT'L L.J. 128, 130-31 (1982) [hereinafter Participation in Commercial Arbitration]
(commenting that the relatively few number of arbitrations actually participated in by
Chinese entities does not necessarily indicate unwillingness to arbitrate). Rather, due to
Chinese aversion to litigation, arbitration represents the only viable international alter-
native. Id.; see also Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 333 (relating
that socialist countries have traditionally tended to view arbitration over litigation as
the expected mode of international trade dispute settlement).
119. See China, Modernization and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 68 (contending
that transnational litigation often results in lengthy, costly, and bitter disputes).
120. See Redfern and Hunter, Introduction, in RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISPUTES, supra note 114, at 5 (commenting that the parties to an arbitration have
control over the arbitration to an extent impossible in proceedings before a court of
law).
121. See Participation in Commercial Arbitration, supra note 118, at 148 (listing
the benefits of a model arbitration clause as permitting the parties to choose the proce-
dures and arbitral body they feel are most appropriate to the dispute).
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reach their decision. 122 Since the arbitrators are not bound by prece-




In an attempt to respond to foreign party concerns regarding the im-
partiality of all Chinese conciliation teams, 24 and as a first step toward
participating in international dispute resolutions, China expanded the
role of the CCPIT to include participation in joint conciliation with
arbitration organizations located in the country of the foreign inves-
tor.125 Joint conciliation developed from the groundbreaking efforts be-
tween the CCPIT and the American Arbitration Association (AAA) to
cooperate jointly in resolving disputes that arose from United States-
China trade. 26 The National Council for United States-China Trade
collaborated with the AAA to inform American corporations of the
joint conciliation facilities. 27 While the first dispute, which involved a
long series of trans-Pacific communications culminating in a week-long
series of face-to-face negotiations in Beijing, the joint CCPIT/AAA
team resolved a second dispute in less than two weeks with no need for
personal meetings, no trans-Pacific travel and no significant disruption
of the ongoing commercial transaction, saving both parties substantial
financial resources and goodwill. 28
As a result of these two successful joint conciliations, the CCPIT
122. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 357 (noting that per-
haps superficially dissimilar, the procedures utilized in an arbitration share certain key
attributes of classic Chinese legal philosophy).
123. Id. at 357-58. The arbitrator does not need to look at precedents but can base
his or her judgment on equity and morality. Id. at 358.
124. See Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 268 (stating that joint conciliation allows
valuable exchange of information concerning differing economic rationales and
jurisprudence).
125. See Lockett, supra note 1, at 262 (describing joint conciliation as an innova-
tive bilateral approach devised to quell foreign fears of national bias when facing only
Chinese conciliators). The procedure for a joint conciliation involves discussions be-
tween a conciliation committee from the CCPIT and a team from a corresponding
arbitration organization of the foreign parties' country. Id.
126. See Holtzmann, A Case Study of Joint Conciliations in Trade with China 6
(1982) (unpublished presentation available at the National Council for U.S.-China
Trade) (providing an extensive description of the circumstances surrounding these first
two joint conciliations from the personal perspective of one of the principal negotia-
tors). Not surprisingly, Holtzmann relates, the United States party in this first dispute
submitted a forty-five page "brief' supported by fourteen exhibits, while the Chinese
side simply sent a telex emphasizing the importance of seeking a friendly solution. Id.
at 6-7.
127. Id. at 6.
128. Id. at 7.
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announced its formal recognition of joint conciliation as a separate
technique and expanded its use to disputes involving commercial con-
tracts with all its foreign partners.12 China has established a joint con-
ciliation center in Hamburg, West Germany,3 0 and has entered into at
least two international agreements concerning the use of joint concilia-
tion.'31 These innovative measures emphasize China's firm belief that
conciliation represents the primary means to resolve transnational dis-
putes while maintaining an ongoing business relationship.13
IV. INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: MODEL
ARBITRATION CLAUSE
Although noted sporadically throughout the text and notes, it war-
rants specific articulation that to date China has participated in very
few verifiable international arbitrations. 33 The most obvious reason is
that, by definition, international commercial arbitration is a private
matter. Arbitration offers the single most important advantage over lit-
igation by assuring privacy.'3 Still, many foreign investors believe that
China has submitted to arbitration outside its borders on very few oc-
casions. 3 5 Additionally, Western lawyers look to the rapid increase in
trade and investment with China, coupled with the important pieces of
international and domestic legislation providing for international arbi-
tration and find it inevitable for suits to have reached the arbitration
stage.
Yet, by recognizing the cultural importance of reconciliation to the
Chinese, a satisfactory answer is possible to fashion. United States
129. See Surrey & Sobel, supra note 92, at 380 (commenting that the Sino-Ameri-
can trade agreement clause providing joint conciliation reflects each government's for-
mal recognition of this form of conciliation).
130. Conciliation Centers to Calm Disputes in West German Trade, China Daily,
Aug. 17, 1987, at 1. See also Surrey & Sobel, supra note 92, at 380-81 (describing the
CCPIT's formal recognition of joint conciliation); accord Rubin, Overview, in INTER-
NATIONAL INVESTMENT DisPuTEs, supra note 6, at 11 (commenting that the rapid
growth of international conciliation centers is a result of the realization that bringing
an international investment dispute to resolution through either litigation or arbitration
may cost more in real terms than the ultimate value of the remedy).
131. Ren Jianxin, Mediation, Conciliation. Arbitration and Litigation in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 15 INTL Bus. LAw. 395, 396 (1987).
132. Id.
133. Robinson & Doumar, "'It is Better to Enter a Tiger's Mouth Than a Court of
Law" or Dispute Resolution Alternatives in U.S.-China Trade, 5 DICK. J. IN'L L.
247, 266 (1987).
134. See McLaughlin, supra note 56, at 212 (summarizing the positive aspects of
arbitration, including confidentiality).
135. See Gossen, When To Enforce Contractual Rights in China, EAST ASIAN
EXEC. REP., Apr. 1986, at 8, 16 (discussing the attitude prevalent among Chinese trad-
ers that a request for arbitration will be seen as an unfriendly gesture).
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trade with China is barely ten years old. Many United States compa-
nies willing to expend the time and resources necessary to develop a
trade/investment link with China are hoping to foster a long-term rela-
tionship.138 Pragmatic concerns blend with cultural sensitivity as West-
ern businesses acknowledge the benefits of Chinese loyalty for "old
friends" and thereby may avoid adversarial posturing. 37 Similarly, the
Chinese are reluctant to risk damaging their ties with the Western cap-
ital and technology so crucial to their modernization goals. As trade
with China matures, the possibility of disputes going forward to the
arbitration stage will increase. In the international community China
has a reputation for strict adherence both to its domestic contractual
obligations as well as its international treaty obligations.' 38
Careful planning during the negotiation of an international arbitra-
tion clause will assure both sides a neutral resolution to their difference
and ensure continued goodwill between the parties. International arbi-
trations between investors with different economic philosophies can
pose many difficulties in implementation. 39 Through careful drafting
of an arbitration clause, investors can avoid some of those obstacles. 4 0
A well-drafted arbitration clause will clearly indicate the arbitration
site, the tribunal's procedural rules, the substantive law applied to re-
solve the dispute, and the means used to enforce the award.' 4 ' In the
136. See Robinson & Doumar, supra note 133, at 267 (positing desire for long-
term gains in China as the Western partner's rationale for not pursuing arbitration). In
the area of government procurement, foreign defense contractors are reluctant to lodge
protests against the Chinese government for fear of damaging their long-term relation-
ships. Id.
137. See id. (stating that Chinese traditional values of maintaining relationships
may also represent a factor in the lack of verifiable arbitrations).
138. See Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 254 (stating that the Chinese have a repu-
tation for strict adherence to contractual terms). The Chinese base their adherence to
contractual terms on their belief that parties who voluntarily enter into an agreement
do so on mutually beneficial terms and therefore, must abide by the terms they set. Id.
139. See Ingriselli, supra note 52, at 376 (noting that the People's Republic of
China has no private domestic corporations). Therefore, the party with whom the for-
eign investor is contracting will either be the State itself or a state-owned corporation.
Id. The Chinese party, aware of the state policy of modernization at any cost, will
likely have goals other than the profit motive in mind. Id. A foreign investor in such
circumstances must rely heavily on a formal mechanism that will provide for the inter-
national and neutral resolution of any disputes. Id.
140. See McLaughlin, supra note 56, at 232 (urging the use of careful drafting
techniques when negotiating an arbitration clause). The parties can avoid many of the
pitfalls associated with international arbitration such as delay, uncertain procedures,
and arbitrability of the underlying contract if time is taken to carefully draft the arbi-
tration clause).
141. See Participation in Commercial Arbitration, supra note 118, at 152 (noting
that the rapid increase in information available to foreign contract negotiators should
allow these legal practitioners to draft precise arbitration agreements).
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event of a dispute, a skillfully drafted arbitration clause ensures ease on
its application to the dispute.
14 2
A. JURISDICTION
The arbitration clause establishes the jurisdiction of the arbitral in-
stitution over the dispute.1 43 Should one party refuse to honor its prom-
ise to arbitrate, the arbitral body will look to the arbitration clause for
authority to compel that party's participation.1 44 If the clause contains
detailed provisions ensuring the defendant a fair hearing had they par-
ticipated, most national courts will enforce a default arbitral award
against the non-participant. 45
B. USE OF CONCILIATION
When constructing the arbitration clause in a contract between a
Chinese and foreign party, it is important to bear in mind the Chinese
belief that all dispute resolutions begin with friendly negotiations. 146 A
successful resolution will maintain the business relationship after the
dispute. The arbitration clause, therefore, should refer to the use of
friendly negotiations between the parties as the initial means of settling
142. See China, Modernization, and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 70 (concluding
that only if the national courts feel comfortable in ordering the performance of an
arbitration agreement will the use of arbitration provide an efficient means to resolve a
dispute). The best way to achieve such judicial non-interference is to draft a clear and
thorough arbitration agreement that specifically addresses such fundamental issues as
procedural due process, adequate and effective notice, and institutional neutrality. Id.
See also Surrey & Sobel, supra note 92, at 426 (concluding that a poorly drafted
arbitration clause could make the parties bitter and subsequent settlement more costly,
while a well-drafted clause often prevents a protracted dispute).
143. See Vagts, Dispute Avoidance Devices in Foreign Direct Investment, in IN-
TERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 6, at 37 (arguing that an effective
arbitration clause can change the dynamics of the dispute negotiation process itself).
The arbitration clause does not merely illustrate the parties' consent to arbitrate; it
provides the basic source of jurisdiction for the arbitral tribunal. Id. See generally
Lockett, supra note 1, app. A, at 268-69 (detailing the jurisdictional reach of an arbi-
tration clause under each international arbitral system).
144. See Participation in Commercial Arbitration, supra note 118, at 148
(stressing that a well-drafted arbitration clause provides the only instrument for the
arbitral body to compel a non-participant to honor its previous agreement to arbitrate).
145. See Delaume, Court Intervention in Arbitral Proceedings, in RESOLVING
TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES, supra note 57, at 195, 200 (describing the scope and effec-
tiveness of arbitration agreements). In addition, if a national court can ascertain a
consistent pattern of behavior between the parties providing for the arbitral settlement
of disputes, it will refuse to entertain actions brought contrary to such an implied
agreement. Id. at 201.
146. See Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12 (advising parties that the
Chinese expect to settle the dispute primarily through friendly consultation and
conciliation).
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the dispute. In the event that friendly negotiation does not resolve the
disagreement, the parties could provide for the use of non-binding joint
conciliation calling upon the expertise of the CCPIT and the AAA. 1"
C. TRIGGER MECHANISM
Acknowledging the Chinese preference for informal conciliatory pro-
cedures, it is important that the arbitration clause contain specific lan-
guage allowing the parties to reach a final, binding decision within a
reasonable amount of time.148 Lengthy delays during the period of in-
formal discussion often result in the unavailability of witnesses and evi-
dence, and the risk of losing the capacity to bring the suit in a judicial
forum due to the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations.1'4
Therefore, the arbitration clause must contain a trigger mechanism
that moves the parties out of informal negotiations into formal arbitra-
tion proceedings.50
D. CHOICE OF FORUM: NEUTRAL THIRD COUNTRIES
The parties should also designate the site of arbitration.' 50 This
threshold issue poses significant problems when each party to the arbi-
tration comes from dissimilar economic and jurisprudential systems.' 0'
147. See id. at 289 (describing recommendations made by United States and Chi-
nese officials to expand the use of joint conciliations).
148. Id. at 258 (cautioning that the arbitration clause must clearly state when a
dispute must move on to arbitration).
149. Id.
150. See Gudgeon, Arbitration Provisions of U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaties, in
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT DISPUTES, supra note 6, at 50 (cautioning that the par-
ties cannot tolerate an open-ended arbitration clause if a workable compulsory arbitral
process and an amicable settlement is the goal of arbitration). An effective arbitration
clause can also serve as an inducement to settle long before protracted litigation ensues.
Id.
151. Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 276. Absence of specific language in the con-
tract to the contrary, the site of the arbitral institution may determine such crucial
factors as procedural rules, governing law, and choice of arbitrators.
152. See Torbert & Zhao, The U.N. Convention on the Sale of Goods, Cii. Bus.
REv., Sept./Oct. 1987, at 52 (stating that in many instances, choice of arbitral forum
is either not included in the arbitral agreement or else it is left blank and decided upon
later in the event of a dispute). This practice leads to unexpected results as evidenced
by the decision in Bauhinia Corp. v. China Nat'l Mach. & Equip. Corp., 819 F.2d 247
(9th Cir. 1987). Bauhinia Corp. contracted with China National Machinery & Equip-
ment Corp.(CMEC) to export Chinese nails to the United States. Id. at 248. When
CMEC failed to deliver on the contract, Bauhinia filed suit in a California district
court. Id. CMEC moved to compel arbitration before FETAC, invoking the arbitration
clause in the contract. Id. The district court granted CMEC's motion, finding the arbi-
tration clause binding, but ordered that the parties submit the dispute to the American
Arbitration Association. Id. Citing the absence of a choice of a forum clause, the court
designated arbitration to be held within its own district. Id. at 248-49. On appeal, the
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Both sides inevitably contend that any dispute resolution proceeding,
even arbitration, held within national borders will be tainted by na-
tional bias.153 In response to these fears, China has become more ame-
nable to the inclusion of arbitration clauses specifying neutral third
country arbitration.5
In fact, disputes arising from specific areas of internal trade relations
with China are now arbitrable in international fora.1 5 The new Joint
Venture Law, for example, provides that if the parties cannot resolve a
joint venture dispute through informal measures, they may submit the
conflict to any mutually agreed upon arbitral body.156 The new Foreign
Economic Contract Law also specifies that the parties may submit their
foreign contract dispute to either a Chinese arbitration organization or
any other arbitral tribunal in accordance with the arbitration clause .15
Those involved in Sino-American trade may rely on the comprehen-
sive bilateral trade treaty established between China and the United
States in 1979.158 On the subject of non-judicial remedies for disputes,
the trade treaty provides that if the parties cannot promptly settle their
dispute through friendly consultation, they may refer the dispute to ar-
bitration. Such arbitration may occur in an arbitral institution in
China, in the United States or in a mutually agreed upon third
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the decision, unable to
find either in the language of the contract or in the intention of the parties any indica-
tion of the location of the forum the parties intended to choose. Id. at 250. Thus it
decided, the lower court's power to order arbitration went no further than its own juris-
dictional boundaries. Id.
153. See Ingriselli, supra note 52, at 377-80 (cautioning that while the FETAC,
China's domestic arbitration tribunal, has attempted to expand and become more fa-
miliar with international issues, arbitration in China still poses a number of significant
obstacles). These obstacles include: arbitrators must come from a FETAC panel of all
Chinese arbitrators; proceedings must be in Chinese; arbitration must be held in China;
and FETAC awards are final and unreviewable by Chinese courts. Id; accord
Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12 (arguing that the principal reason for
United States and Chinese business community's widespread acceptance of joint concil-
iation is that each believes that a national conciliator best protects its interests).
154. See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (outlining the significance of
the inclusion of neutral arbitration in three major pieces of commercial legislation as
well as in the United States-China Trade Agreement).
155. See Joint Venture Law, supra note 43, art. 14 (providing that in the event of
a dispute, the parties may submit the dispute to a Chinese arbitration organization, or
to international arbitration).
156. Id. The parties to a joint venture may allow any arbitral organization to han-
dle disputes if they mutually agree upon its designation in the contract or subsequent to
the dispute. Id. at 84.
157. See Foreign Economic Contracts Law, supra note 43, art. 17 (stating that in
the event mediation and consultation fail, the parties may submit the dispute to any
arbitral organization).
158. Trade Agreement, supra note 59. The purpose of the Trade Agreement is to
strengthen all aspects of Sino-American economic and trade relations. Id. at 1042.
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country.' 59
E. CHOICE OF FORUM: ARBITRAL SITES
Given China's recent willingness to participate in third country arbi-
tration and to enforce awards rendered by foreign arbitration tribunals,
it is necessary to briefly review those arbitral sites likely chosen by in-
vestors to render decisions in Chinese trade and investment disputes.
1. Sweden
Historically, many important East/West contracts have contained
arbitration clauses specifying the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce as
the designated arbitral body.160 Sweden, a non-aligned country, repre-
sents an important arbitral forum for East/West trade. Its reputation
for fairness, competence, and flexibility indicates that its role in inter-
national arbitration should continue to grow at a tremendous rate. 11
As one of the very few developed nations that can claim the distinction
of political neutrality, business executives on both sides of the globe
traditionally look to Sweden for dispassionate resolution of their inter-
national trade disputes.162 While the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce has devised its own set of procedural rules,1 63 it also applies the
arbitration rules of the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL). China and the majority of international
traders accept these arbitration rules.164 Sweden is also a party to the
159. Id. at 1048. Under the treaty, no contracting party shall take any action
against another party before they hold friendly consultations. Id.
160. See Holtzmann, Dispute Resolution Procedures in East/West Trade, 13 INT'L
LAW. 234, 241 (1979) [hereinafter Holtzmann, East/West Trade] (discussing Swe-
den's frequent mention as an arbitral site in many contracts negotiated between the
United States and the Soviet Union during the 1970s); see also Wetter, East Meets
West in Sweden, 13 INT'L LAW. 261, 265-67 (1979) (providing a general history of
American-Soviet dispute resolution under Swedish arbitration).
161. See Lockett, supra note 1, at 250 (reporting that the Chinese prefer the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce because of its reputation of fairness, competence,
and flexibility).
162. See Holtzmann, East/West Trade, supra note 160, at 240-44 (noting that
Swedish arbitration can trace its roots back to the fourteenth century). Sweden is the
most frequently cited third country in current Sino-foreign trade and investment dis-
putes. Id. at 332.
163. See Wetter, Sweden as a Location of International Arbitration Proceedings,
in PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL Busi-
NESS, 223, 253 (1977) [hereinafter Wetter, Sweden as a Location] (commenting on
Swedish arbitration law and practice, as well as providing a translation of relevant
Swedish arbitration provisions); see also ARBITRATION IN SWEDEN 9, 192-201 (Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce, 1977) (noting that Swedish domestic arbitration provi-
sions do not preclude the use of the UNCITRAL rules).
164. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 355 (discussing the
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United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards,165 which ensures that all other acceding na-
tions will enforce arbitral awards rendered in Sweden.
a6
2. Pacific Rim/Hong Kong
Many of the nations along the Pacific Rim share a non-confronta-
tional approach to dispute resolution.1 67 It is expected that China will
enter into arbitration with less reluctance if a site is specified that un-
derstands its economic, cultural, and jurisprudential goals and con-
cerns.168 The Pacific Rim nations generally recognize the importance of
mediating a dispute through conciliation. " If foreign investors, how-
ever, insist on unilaterally invoking arbitration as a first resort in this
region, they stand a good chance of alienating the Chinese partner, ef-
fectively foreclosing any possibility of maintaining an ongoing business
relationship.1 10 These Asian nations express their dissatisfaction with
growing number of organizations that train arbitrators in the use of UNCITRAL
rules). The London Court of Arbitration and the Inter-American Commercial Arbitra-
tion Commission have adopted the UNCITRAL rules. Id.
165. Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 60. This Convention re-
quires that the contracting states recognize and enforce arbitral awards made in an-
other Contracting State. Id. at 338.
166. See Holtzmann, East/West Trade, supra note 160, at 243 (citing Sweden's
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards as significant due to the United States and Chinese reserva-
tion specifying that they will only enforce awards made in the territory of another
acceding State); see also China, Modernization, and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 70
(describing the value of the Convention as assuring business parties that domestic
courts will not extensively review foreign arbitration awards rendered by member
nations).
167. See Weber, International Arbitration is Gaining Acceptance Among Pacific
Rim Traders, 7 CAL. LAW. 29, 30 (1987) (concluding that East and Southeast Asian
societies have historically preferred conciliation as the primary means of dealing with
both daily domestic frictions as well as with overseas trade disputes); cf. Commercial
Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 332-33 (stating that among developing nations,
arbitration is receiving increasing recognition as the preferable alternative to
adjudication).
168. See Witner, Acceptance of Arbitration by Developing Countries in RESOLV-
ING TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES, supra note 57, at 288 (relating that reconciling the
benefits of transnational trade with the strongly perceived need to protect markets from
unfavorable strains on their economic development represents one of the greatest dilem-
mas for a developing country).
169. See Dispute Settlement in China, supra note 31, at 86 (characterizing Asian
business practice as viewing business relationships on an essentially personal basis).
First resort to conciliation rather than arbitration provides a non-confrontational means
to settle the dispute in such a way as to preserve the personal relationship. Id.
170. See Brower, Dispute Resolution and International Arbitration in PAcinc BA-
SIN, supra note 34, at 349 (citing well-known evidence that countries in the Far East
have traditionally resolved all disputes through conciliation). Japan and China espe-
cially tend to avoid situations in which the dispute is decided in a binding fashion by a
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Western arbitrations utilizing Western judicial-like procedures through
their continued non-participation in these arbitral fora.'1 '
The establishment of new arbitration centers along the Pacific Rim
represents one solution to this regional dissatisfaction. The move-
ment of arbitration centers away from Western Europe will encourage
Asian traders to rely more on international arbitration as a method of
dispute settlement.1 73 These regional arbitration centers contain local
panels more responsive to the economic and cultural concerns of the
Pacific Basin and allow developing countries to become more familiar
with international arbitral procedures.1 74 Moreover, the style of arbitra-
tion, now primarily a reflection of its Western adversarial heritage, will
begin to shift toward promotion of conciliatory methods as the Asian
nations begin to contribute to international arbitration procedures.175
By establishing arbitration centers along the Pacific Rim, these na-
tions also hope to enhance the increasing amount of intra-regional
trade.1 7 6 In terms of the sheer volume of trade carried out in the area,
third party. Id.
171. See Witner, supra note 168, at 286 (commenting that while developing coun-
tries have generally accepted the concept of arbitration, many confrontational elements
inherent in the Western model represent a less favorable alternative as their national
and regional policies take hold). Many nations along the Pacific Basin are exerting
pressure on their foreign trading partners to move away from holding arbitration in
major European cities with arbitrators selected from an elite corps of western lawyers.
Id. at 288.
172. See Weber, supra note 167, at 29 (stating that since 1985, new arbitration
centers have opened along the Pacific Rim in San Francisco, Sydney, Melbourne, Van-
couver, and Hong Kong). This is in addition to established institutions in Tokyo, Beij-
ing, Taipei, Kuala Lumpur, and Jakarta. Id. at 30; accord McLaughlin, supra note 56,
at 232 (arguing that the establishment of local arbitral institutions responsive to the
cultural needs and biases of the participants represents a crucial step in enhancing the
image of arbitration among developing countries).
173. See McLaughlin, supra note 56, at 218 (echoing the sentiment of developing
nations that they no longer wish to see Western-oriented arbitral tribunals determine
their disputed commercial relations).
174. See id. at 232 (stating that the establishment of arbitration centers in local
fora provides developing countries the opportunity to participate in arbitration panels).
This encourages developing nations to participate in a greater number of arbitrations,
making the use of third party intervention more acceptable to all involved. Id.
175. See Weber, supra note 167, at 30 (indicating that Asian countries consider
arbitration as the last step in a process that must begin with conciliation). The Asian
nations have always placed great emphasis upon the reconciliation of the parties. Id.
But see id. at 31 (arguing that while cultural factors may have historically promoted
the use of conciliation, pragmatic factors such as the geographic and jurisprudential
diversity of the firms involved and the greater complexity of the commercial relation-
ships will inevitably motivate the region to shift its preference from conciliation to
arbitration).
176. See Hart, Introduction, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF DOING BusiNESS IN ASIA AND
THE PACIFIC i (D. Campbell ed. 1985) (predicting that foreign trade with Asia will
flourish for the remainder of the twentieth century). The economies of the Asian region
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those nations having a Pacific coastline (excluding the Soviet Union)
had a gross product measured at $4.9 trillion in 1980 and is expanding
at the rate of $3 billion per week.7 The nations generating this trade
naturally have a desire to involve themselves in the resolution of any
resulting disputes.
Many nations in this region are currently attempting to establish
themselves as the premier arbitral site for the Asian business commu-
nity.178 Hong Kong's efforts to establish an arbitration center to attract
trade with China presents a special concern to the Pacific Rim business
community.17 9 Hong Kong has become one of the world's leading bank-
ing and commercial centers. Hong Kong also has strong linguistic, cul-
tural, and economic ties with China, with China operating many gov-
ernmental offices and companies in the former Crown colony.'8 0
Recognizing that conciliation is an integral part of the Asian dispute
resolution process, 181 Hong Kong's International Arbitration Centre
(HKIAC) procedures make express provision for the appointment of a
conciliator if the arbitration agreement so provides. 182 If the parties do
not object, the conciliator may ultimately act as the arbitrator, making
for an easy transition from conciliation to arbitration. Also, the
are the fastest growing in the world due in large part to the discovery of the United
States market for its merchandise. Id.
177. See Weber, supra note 167, at 34 (citing California's Office of Economic Re-
search statistics). In the twenty-first century, the Pacific Basin nations will trade most
vigorously with each other). Id. at 35-36.
178. See Brower, Dispute Resolution and International Arbitration in the Pacific
Basin, in PACIFIC BASIN, supra note 34, at 349 (arguing that even in the Far East the
use of arbitration has become unavoidable if the Asian partner wishes to establish an
ongoing relationship with a western investor who relies on the "rule of law").
179. See Ellis & Shea, Foreign Commercial Dispute Settlement in the People's
Republic of China, 6 INT'L TRADE L.J. 155, 172 (1980) (citing several contracts be-
tween China and Hong Kong that have contained arbitration clauses specifying Hong
Kong as the arbitral site); see also Kaplan, Arbitration in Hong Kong, 3 J. INT'L ARB.
Dec. 1986, at 7 (noting Hong Kong's unique and strong relationship with The People's
Republic of China); accord Surrey & Sobel, supra note 92, at 397 (contrasting Swe-
den's current status as the most popular site for Sino-foreign arbitration with Hong
Kong's recent push to capture Sino-foreign disputes).
180. See Kaplan, supra note 179, at 7, 20 (describing Hong Kong's international
recognition as one of the world's leading commercial centers and China's strong sup-
port for the establishment of an arbitration center there).
181. See Surrey & Kellner, Commercial Arbitration in Hong Kong, in LEGAL As-
PECTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN HONG KONG 122, 215 (E. Theroux ed. 1986) (stating
that the Hong Kong's International Arbitration Centre (HKIAC) has formally recog-
nized conciliation as a necessary element in dispute settlement).
182. See Kaplan, supra note 179, at 8 (noting that section 2A of the Hong Kong
Ordinances of 1982 make express provision for the conciliator to move on with the
dispute and serve as arbitrator if the parties make no objection). This provision is simi-
lar to the practices of CCPIT. Id.
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HKIAC follows the UNCITRAL rules"8 3 and has ratified the United
Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards, making enforcement of its awards binding upon other
signatories. 84
Hong Kong has received strong signals of support from China in its
efforts to establish an international arbitral forum. In May 1985, a
Hong Kong delegation returned from Beijing with the news that the
CCPIT had pledged full support for the arbitration project and offered
the services of its experienced arbitrators to sit on arbitration panels of
Hong Kong's new Centre. 8 5 China also pledged financial support of
the project. In 1985, officials in Hong Kong estimated that the Centre
should have sufficient funding due in large part to contributions from
the private Chinese business community.'
Although China may show enthusiasm towards Hong Kong's poten-
tial as a neutral arbitration site, the remainder of the international bus-
iness community is more skeptical. According to local Hong Kong at-
torneys, foreign investors fear that China's ardent support will affect
the ability of the Hong Kong tribunal to provide the objective and neu-
tral arbitral decisions their foreign clients seek."8 7
F. PROCEDURAL RULES
The United States-China Trade Agreement specifically endorses the
arbitration rules of the UNCITRAL when acceptable to the parties
183. Beijing Backs Hong Kong as an Arbitration Center, United States Depart-
ment of Commerce unclassified telegram from American Consul in Hong Kong (June
1985) [hereinafter DOC telegram] (describing the Centre's decision to follow the UN-
CITRAL rules rather than the International Chamber of Commerce's rules).
184. See Surrey & Kellner, supra note 181, at 221 (commenting that the United
Kingdom's ratification of the Convention extends its obligation to the colony). The fact
that China has also acceded to the Convention and that Hong Kong adopted it as part
of its arbitral statute should assure the continued use of the Convention after China
reestablishes its sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997. Id.
185. See DOC telegram, supra note 183, para. I (announcing CCPIT's full support
of Hong Kong as an arbitral site and its pledge to send experienced arbitrators to Hong
Kong).
186. See id. para. 4 (noting that the Centre would have sufficient funds for the first
three years). Of the 2.8 million Hong Kong Dollars the Centre estimates it will need
over the next three years, about 1 million Hong Kong Dollars have come from private
sources, among them the Bank of China and other national Chinese enterprises. Id.
187. See id. para. 5 (commenting on dissatisfaction of the foreign investor concern-
ing Hong Kong's perceived lack of autonomy and objectivity). But see Surrey, Dispute
Settlement in U.S.-China Trade: Another Look, in LEGAL AsPECTs, supra note 83, at
284 (positing that while Hong Kong's close relationship with China might have a nega-
tive effect on the emergence of Hong Kong as a major arbitral site for Asian business
investors, it should have a positive effect on the use of Hong Kong as a site for Sino-
American disputes).
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and to the chosen arbitral body.188 The UNCITRAL rules are espe-
cially designed to bridge the ideological differences between socialist
and capitalist systems and between developing and developed econo-
mies.189 In designing its rules, the United Nations attempted to devise
a model free from any national or institutional biases. A party's request
to include these rules in the arbitration clause does not represent an
effort to promote or to compromise national interests.100
In formulating these rules, the United Nations Drafting Commission
conducted detailed surveys and submitted proposals to some seventy-
five individual arbitral forums around the world. A model set of rules
emerged from this process that synthesized many individual protocols
and agreements.191 Both capitalist and socialist economies can apply
these rules, and both common law and civil law systems can enforce
them.192 Parties may include these rules either on an ad-hoc basis or as
part of a formal arbitration in such international bodies as the Stock-
holm Chamber of Commerce, 193 or the Hong Kong Arbitration Cen-
tre.19 4 The UNCITRAL rules will become the most frequently used
international rules of arbitration in United States-China trade disputes
due to their specific endorsement in the United States-China Trade
Agreement.
G. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Specification of the substantive law used to govern the dispute is the
most difficult drafting task facing the foreign contract negotiator.a°9
188. Trade Agreement, supra note 59, art. VIII, para. 2.
189. See Commercial Dispute Resolution, supra note 4, at 335 (noting that both
industrialized and emerging nations have utilized the neutral rules of the
UNCITRAL).
190. See id. at 354 (urging China's domestic arbitration organs to adopt the UN-
CITRAL rules). One solution to concerns about the impartiality of China's domestic
arbitration institutions is to implement a set of neutral rules of procedure. Id.; See also
Holtzmann, East/West Trade, supra note 160, at 238 (suggesting use of UNCITRAL
rules as the only unbiased set of international trade rules).
191. See Commercial Dispute Resolutions, supra note 4, at 334 (providing a de-
tailed history of the United Nations methods in drafting the UNCITRAL rules).
192. See Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12, at 326 (praising the use of
UNICTRAL rules as the most modern rules available and best suited not only for use
with traditional export/import contracts, but also adaptable for use with more complex
disputes involving technology transfer and joint venture liability).
193. See Wetter, Sweden as a Location, supra note 163, at 254 (describing the
procedural rules of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce).
194. See Kaplan, supra note 179, at 9 (describing Hong Kong's decision to choose
the UNCITRAL rules).
195. See Participation in Commercial Arbitration, note 107, at 146 (commenting
on China's recent insistence on the application of Chinese laws to govern economic
trade disputes as the most difficult obstacle to overcome when attempting to negotiate
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Prior to 1984, the vast majority of Sino-foreign arbitration clauses were
silent on the choice of law issue. Chinese negotiators preferred not to
specify the substantive law in the contract, leaving that issue to the
discretion of the arbitral tribunal. 198 The Chinese insist, however, that
the arbitrators rely on fundamental Chinese principles of independence,
equality and mutual benefit, and reference to international commercial
practice when making the choice of law determination.1 9
Previously, the absence of a choice of law provision required the ar-
bitrators to either resort to a national conflicts of law system or to ap-
ply international conflicts of law principles.1 98 Under either system, fac-
tors such as substantial contacts with the country, place of
performance, and nationality of the parties play an important role in
determining which system of domestic laws will apply.199 Due to the
fact that the majority of Sino-foreign contracts are negotiated, exe-
cuted, and performed in China, Chinese law was often chosen for use
in the arbitration.2 00 Until recently, however, China had no cohesive
body of commercial legislation and although China has passed many
laws in recent years, it has relatively little experience in applying these
laws to international commercial transactions.2 01
In addition, the Chinese provide in many pieces of foreign contract
legislation, for the exclusive use of Chinese law in the event of a breach
with a foreign investor. The Foreign Economic Contract Law adopted
in March 1985 broadly stipulates that Chinese law must apply to any
joint venture utilizing Chinese and foreign capital; any contract calling
neutral legal principles).
196. See Surrey & Sobel, supra note 92, at 398 (noting that Chinese negotiators
will usually avoid specifying the substantive law, leaving that decision to the arbitral
tribunal and relying on the choice of law principles of the arbitral forum to designate
Chinese law).
197. See id. (noting China's insistence that third country arbitrators refer to Chi-
nese arbitration principles when choosing the substantive law of the arbitration). The
Chinese arbitration principles include independence, equality and mutual benefit, and
reference to international commercial practice. Id. at 398.
198. See Participation in Commercial Arbitration, supra note 118, at 146 (observ-
ing that upon the exclusion of a choice of law provision, the arbitrators may resort to
international trade practice).
199. See Lockett, supra note 1, at App. A (giving a short synopsis of the choice of
law procedures used by each major arbitral body when determining substantive law).
200. See Participation in Commercial Arbitration, supra note 118, at 146 (noting
that due to the fact that the majority of contracts are signed in China and directly
relate to Chinese products or resources, Chinese law would usually apply).
201. See Holtzmann, U.S.-China Trade, supra note 12, at 235 (noting United
States investors' reluctance to litigate in foreign courts that operate with substantially
different economic, social, and legal systems). Those who trade with or invest in China
feel strongly that the lack of information available concerning the practice or procedure
used in Chinese civil courts makes litigation in China an impossibility. Id.
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for a cooperative enterprise between foreign and domestic partners or;
any contact involving Sino-foreign exploration or exploitation of Chi-
nese natural resources. 02 International practice will govern only to the
extent that the present state of Chinese law does not cover the
dispute.203
In contracts signed after January 1, 1988, however, omission of a
choice of law clause in contracts for the sale of goods will trigger the
use of the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Interna-
tional Sale of Goods (CISG).20 1 Both the United States and China are
signatories to this Convention that covers all contracts for the sale of
goods between parties with places of business in China or the United
States.205 Historically, no other country omits a choice of law clause as
frequently as China, and therefore, the CISG should have a greater
impact on United States trade with China than on any other United
States trading partner.0 6 Unless otherwise stipulated, the CISG takes
precedence over both the United States Uniform Commercial Code and
the Foreign Economic Contract Law.20 7 The Chinese Ministry of For-
eign Economic Relations and Trade has instructed its various trade or-
ganizations to harmonize their contracts with the language of the new
treaty.208 The CISG, however, applies only to the sale of goods; it does
not cover contracts for the supply of labor or services which would in-
202. See Foreign Economic Contracts Law, supra note 43, art. 5 (stipulating when
Chinese laws will apply to joint ventures and cooperative ventures); see also Tang
Houzhi, supra note 105, at 2 (explaining that the Foreign Economic Contracts Law
disallows the parties to apply foreign substantive law to the contract).
203. See, e.g., Mao Tong & Burke, Supreme People's Court Notice on the Foreign
Economic Contracts Law, EAST ASIAN ExEc. RPT., May 1988, at 10 (describing this
Notice as the first step in transforming the Foreign Economic Contracts Law from a
statement of general principles to a refined body of contract law). The Supreme Court's
interpretation of the FECL states that only Chinese law applies to joint ventures and
contracts for the exploration and exploitation of Chinese natural resources. Id.
204. Berlin, U.N. Trade Pact Triggered, Wash. Post, Dec. 12, 1986, at D II
(stressing that the establishment of international legal norms under which parties can
resolve contractual differences among varying national systems as the main significance
of the Convention).
205. See Torbert & Zhao, supra note 152, at 52 (stating that in the event that the
choice of law provision is not specified in the agreement, the terms of the CISG will
apply automatically to contracts for the sale of goods between parties with places of
business in China or the United States).
206. Id.
207. Salem, Two Steps Forward, FAR EAST ECON. REV., Jan. 21, 1988, at 51. The
CISG may take precedence over China's present Foreign Economics Contracts Law
and the United States Uniform Commercial Code. Id.
208. Id. Following China's accession to the Convention, various foreign trade orga-
nizations received instructions to align their contract provisions with the terms of the
CISG. Id.
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elude advanced technology, China's most sought after item. 09 As for
mixed contracts that supply both goods and services, the applicability
of the CISG provisions remains unclear.21
H. ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS
The main value of arbitration lies in its ability to resolve disputes
and render awards without forcing either party to litigate in the domes-
tic courts of its foreign partner. 1' Given China's gradual acceptance of
international arbitration, international mechanisms for the enforcement
of these arbitral awards become crucial. 2  Under principles of private
international law, the domestic law of the country where enforcement is
sought governs the enforcement of the award.213 Without some form of
international agreement, recognition of foreign arbitral awards by na-
tional courts is sporadic at best. If an arbitral award is enforced only
after extensive judicial review, the arbitration process becomes uncer-
tain, if not completely futile. 4
Bilateral and multilateral treaties significantly increase the effective-
ness of foreign awards by limiting the grounds available for denial of
recognition and enforcement.21 5 In 1986, the Standing Committee of
the National People's Council approved China's accession to the
United Nation Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of For-
eign Arbitral Awards.2 e This decision is the most significant step to
date toward total acceptance of international arbitration. Chinese
209. See Torbert & Zhao, supra note 152, at 52 (stating that the CISG will not
apply to contracts such as those that provide for supply of labor, services, and technol-
ogy transfer).
210. See id. (questioning whether in the case of a mixed sale of goods and services
the CISG will apply).
211. See China, Modernization, and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 70 (stating that
the main value of the Convention on the Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards is
that a recalcitrant party is required to satisfy an adverse judgment without resorting to
domestic judicial review).
212. See Chew-Lafitte, supra note 5, at 280 (cautioning that arbitration proceed-
ings are meaningful only to the extent that the award becomes binding upon the
parties).
213. See China, Modernization, and Arbitration, supra note 1, at 70 (asserting
that general principles of international law does not obligate a state to recognize an
arbitral award rendered outside its borders).
214. Delaume, supra note 145, at 217-21.
215. See id. at 222 (stating that modern treaty, statutory, and judicial develop-
ments have greatly contributed to facilitating the recognition and enforcement of trans-
national arbitral awards).
216. See generally Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 60 (requir-
ing contracting states to enforce each other's arbitral awards by limiting the grounds
upon which a national court may refuse recognition).
217. See Liu Shaoshan, A Brief Account of the New York Convention of 1958,
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Communist Party leaders have endorsed accession as a major step in
the realization of their modernization goals. 18
The Convention specifies the obligations and conditions under which
the contracting states are bound to recognize and execute foreign arbi-
tral awards. Nations in every region of the globe including most of the
major international traders have ratified and supported the Conven-
tion. 19 China's accession to the Convention shows confidence, not only
in the quality of its own arbitral tribunals, but also in the fairness of
awards rendered in foreign institutions.
CONCLUSION
China has begun to look beyond its borders to seek international res-
olution of trade disputes involving its nationals. This trend toward ac-
ceptance not only of arbitration but more significantly of international
arbitration is confirmed by China's ratification of such bilateral and
multilateral treaties as the United States-China Trade Agreement, the
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, and the United Nations Convention on Con-
tracts for the International Sale of Goods. An increasing number of
foreign contract clauses provide for joint conciliation and three major
pieces of foreign economic legislation specifically promote the use of
neutral third country arbitrations. China's desire to fully participate in
the international economic marketplace has muted, if not overcome, its
historic reluctance to resolve disputes in international fora.
Although philosophical and cultural barriers may impede China's
willingness to turn to the West in seeking neutral third party arbitra-
tion, the enthusiasm of Pacific Rim nations expressed in the develop-
ment of their own arbitration centers, each specializing in conciliatory
modes of arbitration, points to a day in the very near future when
China will arbitrate beyond its borders.
CHINA PATENTS AND TRADE, Feb. 1987, at 9, 10 (stressing the importance of China's
accession to the Convention in the implementation of current Chinese Communist
Party policies).
218. Id. at 9 (noting that China's accession to the Convention will greatly develop
its foreign economic and trade relations, necessary elements for a successful moderniza-
tion program).
219. See id. (describing the widespread multilateral acceptance of the Convention).
Since the Convention came into force in 1959, seventy-one Contracting States, includ-
ing most major trading nations, have ratified it. Id.
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